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COMPELLED SPEECH—CONNECTICUT AND MASSACHUSETTS: 
INADVERTENTLY INVITING SUPPRESSION OF DISSIDENT 
POLITICAL EXPRESSION 
Joseph T. Poulsen * 
	  
People often argue that transparency in a democracy is 
imperative.  Transparency, though, may only be achieved 
through disclosure.  In recent years, the United States Supreme 
Court has strongly favored compelled disclosure in the context 
of political expression.  Yet, there exists an exception to this 
mandate for minor, dissident political parties.  This exception, 
established in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per 
curiam), purports to shield those parties from threats, 
harassment, and reprisals due to their minority status.  
Historically this exception has been narrowly utilized to protect 
Cold War era socialist political parties. 
 
This Note argues that the Buckley minor-party exception 
should be extended to not only encompass minor, partisan 
political parties, but also issue-based minority groups and their 
members.  This Note will further argue that issue-oriented 
expression through association deserves the same First 
Amendment protection as direct advocacy; that association by 
membership deserves greater protection than association 
through monetary support; and that association by membership 
is as strong as, and therefore deserves the same degree of 
protection, as direct expression. 
 
Absent such extension of the Buckley minor-party exception, 
recent legislation enacted by Connecticut and Massachusetts, is 
susceptible to a constitutional challenge by issue-oriented 
minority groups and their members who are subject to 
mandatory disclosure of personal information.	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[C]ritique can . . . be a form of commitment, a means of laying a 
claim. It’s the ultimate gesture of citizenship. A way of saying: 
I’m not just passing through, I live here.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several highly 
publicized and controversial decisions concerning campaign 
finance.  The Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission2 upheld challenged disclosure requirements3 within 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 under the 
justification that electoral transparency allows the electorate to 
make informed decisions.4  However, since Citizens United, 
anonymous spending by tax-exempt groups not subject to federal 
disclosure laws has increased from approximately $69.2 million in 
the 2008 federal election cycle,5 to approximately $308.7 million in 
the 2012 cycle.6  Non-disclosed spending similarly increased 
between non-presidential cycles.7  Further, a political network 
	  
*  Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2016.  I 
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1.   Henry Louis Gates Jr., Patriotism, THE NATION, July 15, 1991, at 91. 
2.   558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3.  The challenged provision required a disclaimer to identify the person 
responsible for the content of any electioneering communication funded by a non-
candidate, as well as a disclosure statement filed with the Federal Election Commission 
by any person who spent $10,000 or more on electioneering communications within a 
calendar year.  Id. at 366. 
4.    Id. at 371. 
5.  2008 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=O&type=U
&chrt=D [http://perma.cc/3GGG-Y84B] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
6.  2012 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/M9AX-HL78] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).  See also Russ 
Choma, Money Won on Tuesday, But Rules of the Game Changed, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/11/ 
money-won-on-tuesday-but-rules-of-the-game-changed/ [http://perma.cc/N4PM-
DUDV] (analyzing the influx of anonymous funding in the 2014 mid-term elections). 
7.  Compare 2014 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2014&chrt= 
D&disp=O&type=U [http://perma.cc/C6UW-E3GZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) 
(showing $173.2 million in non-disclosed spending), and 2010 Outside Spending, by 
Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside 
spending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=D&disp=O&type=U [http://perma.cc/6E3X-
L8EH] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (showing $135.6 million in non-disclosed spending) 
with 2006 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php? 
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created and run by Charles and David Koch plans to spend nearly 
$900 million in 2016 federal elections, most of which would not 
require donor disclosure.8  An organization created under Section 
501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code9 is the primary tool utilized to 
exploit a major disclosure law loophole.10  Exploitation occurs 
when a 501(c) organization uses its own funds to pay for an 
independent expenditure or other electioneering communication 
which advocates for an issue or candidate in an election.11  This 
loophole was less utilitarian prior to Citizens United because the 
federal law Citizens United deemed unconstitutional, did not allow 
corporations to fund express advocacy expenditures or 
electioneering communications from their corporate treasuries.12 
	  
cycle=2006&chrt=D&disp=O&type=U [http://perma.cc/9RFJ-J3GJ] (last visited Oct. 
30, 2015) (showing just $5.2 million in non-disclosed spending). 
8.    Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on 
Par With Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html. 
9.   26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2010).  The most notable of which for the purposes of this 
Note arise from 501(c)(4) and are known as social welfare groups.  See generally 
Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate-
Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1337 (2013). 
10.  See 2008 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/3GGG-Y84B] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); 2012 Outside 
Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/M9AX-HL78] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).  The loophole 
exists because 501(c) organizations are overseen by the Internal Revenue Service 
rather than a regulatory agency related to electoral law such as the Federal Election 
Commission.  The focus of the IRS is not to enforce electoral law but to ensure these 
organizations qualify for tax-exempt status.  Social welfare groups may therefore 
participate in political advocacy, so long as their primary function remains “to further 
the common good and general welfare of the people of the community (such as by 
bringing about civic betterment and social improvements).”  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) 
(2012).  In effect these organizations may dedicate 49.9% of their funding to political 
advocacy, while dedicating their remainder to issue advocacy.  See Outside Spending: 
Frequently Asked Questions About 501(c)(4) Groups, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/faq.php [http://perma.cc/Y8PS-
U5BC] (last visited Jan. 31, 2015); Emma Schwartz, The Rules That Govern 501(c)(4)s, 
PBS (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:12 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-
elections-politics/big-sky-big-money/the-rules-that-govern-501c4s/ 
[http://perma.cc/J4L5-HYX2]. 
11.    The definition of an independent expenditure and electioneering 
communication varies by jurisdiction.  See Thomas B. Edsall, In Defense of 
Anonymous Political Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
03/19/opinion/edsall-in-defense-of-anonymous-political-giving.html [http://perma.cc/U6 
WM-9DVA]. 
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.  See also The Editorial Board, Dark 
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As a result of the influx of so-called “dark money” in politics, 
many states now promote increased political transparency with 
revamped laws that conform to Citizens United by disclosing, at 
minimum, the names and addresses of supporters of candidates, 
political parties, and other electoral groups.13  However, by 
attempting to create greater political transparency, newly enacted 
state statutes may infringe on a person’s First Amendment right to 
free speech by disallowing anonymous expression.  This 
infringement can operate as a complete, yet unintended, bar to 
minority or dissident viewpoints.14  Transparency is an important, 
admirable objective, but vigorous legislative debate is required to 
evaluate the far-reaching effects compelled disclosure laws have on 
our entire political system.  Anonymous expression has an 
important role in the political process.  In fact, many of the 
country’s founding fathers used pseudonyms to publish political 
writings, such as the Federalist Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers.15 
The Supreme Court in recent years has generally favored 
disclosure laws.16  However, some contemporary proponents of 
anonymity argue the First Amendment protects anonymous 
electoral expression, such as spending, and cite Patterson17 and 
McIntrye v. Ohio Elections Commission18 in support of that 
	  
Money Helped Win the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/opinion/sunday/dark-money-helped-win-the-
senate.html?smid=tw-share (discussing the effect of dark money on races for the U.S. 
Senate in the 2014 mid-term elections); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: 
Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864 
(2011) (“[D]isclosure failed colossally in the 2010 election.  The upside-down rules 
reached their absurd climax, exposing numerous instances of small-scale citizen 
participation but concealing the giant influence of financially and politically powerful 
entities.”). 
13.  See generally Mark Pazniokas, Malloy Signs Campaign Finance Law that 
Loosens Restrictions, THE CONNECTICUT MIRROR, (June 19, 2013), 
http://ctmirror.org/malloy-signs-campaign-finance-law-loosens-restrictions/; Shira 
Schoenberg, Massachusetts House passes Super PAC disclosure bill, MASS LIVE (July 
31, 2014, 7:28 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/07/massachusetts_ 
house_passes_sup.html [http://perma.cc/MY7D-E6BD]. 
14.  See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
15.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (published under the 
name “Publius”); THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 
University of Chicago Press 2007). 
16. See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003). 
17.  Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449.  See infra Part I.A. 
18.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  See infra Part I.A. 
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proposition.19  They assert the First Amendment’s umbrella 
protects dissenters and those with minority viewpoints from 
threats, harassment, and retaliation.20 
The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, created an exception 
to compelled disclosure when a minor political party faces a 
reasonable probability of receiving threats, harassment, or 
reprisals.21  Yet, the Supreme Court has not clarified what degree 
of threat, harassment, or reprisal is sufficient to satisfy this 
standard.  Additionally, Citizens United was decided with no 
reference to Patterson despite its substantial relevance.22  The 
result is that Citizens United created a precarious framework that 
states are attempting to emulate, thereby leaving themselves 
susceptible to an as-applied challenge23 by a minority or dissident 
party on the basis of Patterson.24 
This Note argues that the Buckley minor-party exception 
should be extended to not only encompass minor, partisan political 
parties, but also issue-based minority groups and their members.  
Additionally, this Note argues that issue-oriented expression 
through association deserves the same First Amendment protection 
as direct advocacy.  Further, this Note contend that association by 
membership deserves greater protection than association through 
monetary means.  Finally, this Note will conclude that association 
by membership is as strong as, and therefore deserves the same 
degree of protection, as the express speech at issue in McIntyre.  
The result of such would be to recognize a right of anonymous 
association. 
Part I of this Note explores relevant Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding disclosure25 pertaining to politics.  Part 
II.A will distinguish true minority advocates from those who are 
merely out of power.  Part II.B will argue a low evidentiary level of 
threats, harassment, and reprisals is appropriate to overcome a 
	  
19.  Edsall, supra note 11. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). 
22.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
23.  An as-applied challenge alleges a particular law or policy is constitutional on 
its face, but is unconstitutional as it is applied to a particular person, group, or class, 
whereas a facial challenge alleges a particular law or policy may never be 
constitutional.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
24.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
25.  The personal information required for disclosure varies between the various 
state and federal laws.  See infra Part I.A–B.  Generally, the personal information to be 
disclosed at least includes: name, address, occupation, employer, and business address.  
See infra Part I.A–B. 
94 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:89 
state’s informational interest and therefore does not need to rise to 
the level seen in Patterson.  Part II.C defines the strength of 
associational speech in relation to other forms of speech and will 
argue associational speech based on membership is as strong as 
express speech, and therefore deserves the same degree of 
protection.  Part II.D will argue that Patterson fits within the 
Citizens United framework.  Finally, Part III will examine recently 
enacted legislation from Connecticut and Massachusetts that aims 
to comply with Citizens United and will argue the revamped 
Connecticut and Massachusetts disclosure laws are each susceptible 
to as-applied challenges by minority advocates due to infringement 
of their freedom to associate. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND COMPELLED DISCLOSURE 
A. Exceptions to Compelled Disclosure: Where the First 
Amendment Prevails 
In 1958 the freedom to associate was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a right under the First Amendment in 
Patterson.26  In that case, an Alabama statute required foreign 
corporations to register with the Secretary of State to do business 
within the state.27  The Alabama Attorney General initiated an 
equity action against the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (hereinafter “NAACP”) to 
prevent the NAACP from doing business within, and to expel them 
from the State.28  Alabama requested the NAACP produce a large 
quantity of documents and records that included “the names and 
addresses of all Alabama members and agents of the 
Association.”29  The NAACP then produced all requested 
documentation, including names and addresses of all officers and 
agents, except a list identifying rank-and-file members.30  The 
	  
26.  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
27.  Id. at 451. 
28.  Id. at 452.  The complaint alleged the NAACP’s business in Alabama 
included providing legal assistance to minority students who sought admission to a state 
university and support of a bus line boycott that sought equal seating for passengers 
regardless of race.  Id. 
29.  Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30. Id.  These “rank-and-file” members were those who had no positions of 
power, authority, or decision making within the NAACP.  Id.  For example, many (if 
not all) of these “rank-and-file” members were unpaid volunteers.  Brief for Petitioner 
at 7, Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958) (No. 91, October Term, 1957), 1957 WL 55387 (U.S.), at *7. 
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NAACP was held in contempt and fined $100,000.31 
Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the NAACP argued that 
production and disclosure of membership lists would “abridge the 
rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful association 
in support of their common beliefs.”32  The Court recognized the 
right to associate when it held, 
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association . . . . It is beyond debate that freedom to 
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas 
is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
Additionally, it is not necessary for associational rights to be 
directly restricted, rather, governmental action which in effect 
discourages exercise of indispensable liberties may be found to be 
an “unconstitutional intimidation” upon such rights.34  Importantly, 
the Court stated privacy is a particularly indispensable aspect of 
freedom of association for groups with dissident viewpoints.35 
Applying the newly recognized freedom of association to the 
issue, the Court found that rank-and-file members were subjected 
to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility” simply by 
disclosing their identity.36  Threats, harassment, or reprisals of that 
nature and magnitude would only discourage potential members 
from joining while encouraging then-current members to leave the 
NAACP.37  The Court ruled a state must have a compelling interest 
to overcome freedom of association and that Alabama’s proposed 
interest to ensure the NAACP’s statutory compliance regarding its 
intrastate business activities did not meet that standard of “closest 
scrutiny.”38 
	  
31.  Id. at 454.  The equivalent purchasing power of that sum in 2015 dollars is 
approximately $874,797.79.  CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=100%2C000.00&year1=1956&year2=2015 
[http://perma.cc/3U4Y-GQL2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
32.  Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 461. 
35.  Id. at 462. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 463. 
38.  Id. at 461, 464.  Closest scrutiny is not to be confused with strict scrutiny used 
in other subsequent constitutional contexts; however, the requisite standard of a 
compelling governmental interest is the same in each standard.  See Anthony 
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Patterson and its immediate progeny39 arose during the 
tumultuous civil rights era.  Thus, freedom of association was 
recognized to protect “civil rights activists in the segregated 
South”40 from compelled disclosure, which would have subjected 
those persons to threats, harassment, or reprisals, all physical and 
economic in nature.41  As a result of applying closest scrutiny in 
cases dealing with the violent segregated South and McCarthy-era 
blacklists, it was unclear how high the Court set the standard of 
threats, harassment, or reprisals for future persons to defend 
against disclosure by asserting freedom of association.42 
Contemporary political advocacy is often contentious, but 
advocates usually do not face the same threat of serious harm as 
those from the civil rights era.43  While deeming Patterson’s 
disclosure law an unconstitutional restriction on associational 
freedom, in other cases the Court has analyzed express political 
speech differently when anonymity protects a speaker who faces 
harm that is less serious than seen by rank-and-file NAACP 
members.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission illustrates the 
proposition that an individual who expresses her point of view on a 
contentious political issue may be protected from disclosure to 
ensure that her viewpoint is not silenced from public debate.44  At 
issue was a disclosure statute that the Ohio Supreme Court deemed 
constitutional on the basis that it was a part of the electoral process 
and only imposed a “‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ burden 
on the rights of voters.”45 
	  
Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 424 n.67 
(2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s standards of review in First Amendment 
contexts as having similar tests to standards of review in other constitutional contexts 
(i.e. “exacting scrutiny” in Buckley with “intermediate scrutiny.”)). 
39.  See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
40.  McGeveran, supra note 12 at 866. 
41.  Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461, 466. 
42.  The standard may be that persons must face the very same form and degree 
of threats, harassment, or reprisals manifested in NAACP v. Alabama and Brown v. 
Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982).  See 
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Supreme 
Court precedent regarding the appropriate standard of review is not a model of 
clarity.”). 
43. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.12, Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of 
Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (No. 91, October Term, 
1957), 1957 WL 55387 (U.S.), at *16 n.12 (citing actual contemporary instances of 
“[t]hreats and . . . acts of violence . . . directed against Negroes” who sought “to assist 
their constitutional rights”). 
44.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
45.  Id. at 345 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 154 
(1993)). 
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The challenger to the Ohio disclosure statute, Margaret 
McIntyre, was fined after distributing anonymous leaflets that 
advocated against a school tax levy at issue in an upcoming 
referendum.46  McIntyre wrote the contents, manufactured, and 
distributed the leaflets herself.47  The Ohio statute barred advocacy 
intended to influence voters without the producer’s name, business 
and residential addresses.48  Importantly, some of the leaflets were 
signed by McIntyre while others were signed “CONCERNED 
PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS” in violation of Ohio’s statute.49  
There was no indication the leaflets’ contents were “false, 
misleading, or libelous.”50 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that the First 
Amendment protects an author’s choice of anonymity.51  That 
choice may be made due to fear of threats, harassment, reprisals, 
social ostracism, to preserve privacy, or to strengthen the 
persuasiveness of an assertion.52  Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, emphasized those rationales’ deep roots in American 
history by using the Federalist Papers and the secret ballot as 
illustrative examples.53 
While the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis 
that it was a part of the electoral process, because it only applied to 
speech designed to influence elections, and only imposed a 
“‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ burden on the rights of 
voters,”54 the United States Supreme Court determined the statute 
was a regulation of the content of “pure speech” rather than the 
“mechanics of the electoral process.”55  Further, the content of the 
pamphlet constituted “core” speech as defined in Buckley v. 
Valeo,56 and thus is subject to exacting scrutiny.57  In fact, 
	  
46.  Id. at 337. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 338 n.3. 
49.  Id. at 337. 
50.  Id.  A state has an interest in informing the electorate, which satisfies 
exacting scrutiny.  See infra Part I.B. 
51.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
52.  Id. at 341–42. 
53.  Id. at 343 n.6. Justice Stevens also used blind-graded exams in law school as a 
modern attempt to eliminate bias through anonymity.  Id. at 342 n.5.  See also Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and 
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”). 
54.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344–45 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1993)). 
55.  Id. at 345. 
56.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (“Discussion of public 
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McIntyre’s type of speech, advocacy regarding a contentious 
political issue, “is the essence of First Amendment expression.”58 
Ohio proffered two allegedly overriding interests to uphold 
the statute: to prevent fraudulent and libelous advocacy, and to 
create an informed electorate.59  Providing an electorate with 
information pertaining to the identity of an advocate does not 
change the content of an assertion, and may not even enhance the 
voter’s ability to assess its validity.60  Indeed, as Margaret McIntyre 
was an individual, a voter would need to personally know her for 
McIntyre’s identity, as the pamphlet’s scrivener, to be of any use to 
the voter in assessing the merits of its contents.61  Therefore, the 
informational interest was held insufficient to satisfy exacting 
scrutiny.62 
While the Court agreed that preventing fraud and libel during 
election season carried “special weight,” the fact that other 
safeguards existed to prevent fraud and libel, demonstrated that 
compelled disclosure served only to supplement those other 
safeguards.63  The disclosure provision did not satisfy the exacting 
scrutiny standard as it applied to speech that was in no way 
fraudulent or libelous and therefore was judged overly broad.64  As 
	  
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the 
system of government established by our Constitution.  The First Amendment affords 
the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1948)).  While Buckley 
involved political speech concerning a candidate for office, those principles apply 
equally to issue-based elections, as seen in McIntyre.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. 
57.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346.  Exacting scrutiny requires a law burdening core 
political speech to be “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”  Id. at 
347.  Further, “[w]hile [exacting scrutiny] resembles what the Court has termed 
intermediate scrutiny elsewhere, the Court itself does not draw that analogy in other 
First Amendment contexts.”  Johnstone, supra note 38. 
58.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. 
59.  Id. at 348. 
60.  Id. at 348–49. 
 Don’t underestimate the common man.  People are intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing.  They can see it is 
anonymous.  They know it is anonymous.  They can evaluate its anonymity 
along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to 
read that message.  And then, once they have done so, it is for them to 
decide what is ‘responsible’, what is valuable, and what is truth. 
Id. at 348–49 n.11 (1995) (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974)). 
61.  Id. at 348–49. 
62.  Id. at 349. 
63.  Id. at 350.  Those other safeguards were specific and detailed prohibitions 
located within Ohio’s Election Code.  Id. at 349–50 n.12. 
64.  Id. at 351. 
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a result, the disclosure provision was not sufficient to prevent fraud 
and libel,65 and consequently, violated the First Amendment.66 
Despite McIntyre’s narrow holding, which considered only 
Ohio’s blanket prohibition of anonymous campaign literature, the 
Court’s rationale allowed for a more expansive use for individuals 
for two reasons.67  First, prior cases that upheld compelled 
disclosure laws were distinguished as being a less intrusive 
infringement on First Amendment rights in light of more 
compelling state interests.68  However, as the Court noted, 
compelled disclosure of an individual engaging in “core” speech is 
more intrusive than disclosure of the identity of a contributor of an 
independent expenditure.69  In fact, speech expressed by monetary 
means is generally less controversial and therefore less likely to 
invoke threats, harassment, or reprisals because it is “less specific, 
less personal, and less provocative.”70  Second, regardless of 
individuals’ reasons to desire anonymity, the interest in having 
anonymous writings within the “marketplace of ideas 
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring 
disclosure as a condition of entry.”71 
Thus, McIntyre stands as a strong shield to those individuals 
who speak72 anonymously about controversial political issues, 
despite the possibility of fraudulent or libelous misuse of such a 
right.73  Further, the McIntyre shield protects not only individuals’ 
First Amendment freedoms, but also the “marketplace of ideas” as 
	  
65.  Id. at 353. 
66.  Id. at 356. 
67.  McGeveran, supra note 121 at 859 (“The rationale for the [McIntyre] Court’s 
decision was a robust understanding of privacy rights for political speech and 
association.”).  See also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150, 166 n.14 (2002) (“[T]he [challengers] do not themselves object to a loss of 
anonymity . . . . We may . . . consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech 
rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration provision 
would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously.”); Buckley v. Am. 
Const. Law Found., Inc. 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999) (“Our decision in McIntyre . . . is 
instructive . . . .”). 
68. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356.  Those other statutes were considered less 
intrusive because, in part, they applied only to candidate elections.  Id. at 353. 
69.  Id. at 355 (explaining that the Court explicitly distinguished Buckley); see 
infra Part I.B. 
70.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355. 
71.  Id. at 342. 
72.  “Speak” here refers only to written advocacy. 
73.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.  “[I]n general, our society accords greater weight 
to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”  Id. 
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a matter of public policy.74 
B. The Supreme Court’s Evolution in Upholding Federal 
Disclosure Laws 
Compelled disclosure in the political arena has been 
increasingly favored by the Supreme Court since McIntyre.75  These 
recent cases invoke an earlier principle, established by Buckley v. 
Valeo, that a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or 
reprisals is necessary to form a constitutional challenge of 
compelled disclosure laws.76  Interestingly, no mention is made of 
McIntyre and this post-McIntyre jurisprudence ignores McIntyre’s 
protection of core political speech in favor of an earlier principal 
that such speech need only be protected when faced with threats, 
harassment, or reprisals.77  The standard of review for reporting 
and disclosure requirements was established in Buckley v. Valeo, 
which relied on Patterson.78 
Buckley included a challenge to portions of federal law that 
required a political committee to disclose the name and address of 
any donor who contributed more than ten dollars as well as the 
occupation and principal place of business of any donor who 
contributed greater than one hundred dollars in the aggregate.79  
The Court applied exacting scrutiny, a standard requiring a 
“relevant correlation” or “substantial relation” between a 
legitimate government interest and the disclosed information.80  
	  
74.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
75.  See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
See also BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 
154 (2008) (“[A]nonymity claims have been trumped in other cases by the asserted 
democratic interest in disclosure as a kind of mechanism for regulation in the political 
marketplace.”). 
76.  See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 860. 
77.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). 
78.  Id. at 64.  See also Johnstone, supra note 38, at 423 (“Buckley cited NAACP 
for its standard of review, but loosened the strict ‘closest scrutiny’ standard to the 
ironically imprecise ‘exacting scrutiny’ standard.”). 
79.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 62–63.  “Political committee is defined . . . as a group of 
persons that receives contributions or makes expenditures of over $1,000 in a calendar 
year.  Both definitions [of contributions and expenditures] focus on the use of money 
or other objects of value for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or election 
of any person to federal office.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Portions of Buckley 
involved facial challenges to the law; however, this Note is concerned only with the 
portions of Buckley that involve as-applied analysis. 
80.  Id. at 64. 
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Notably, the Court deviated from Patterson’s “strictest scrutiny” 
standard, which applies, when “beliefs sought to be advanced by 
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters.”81  While it acknowledged a strict test was necessary due to 
the possibility of substantial infringement of First Amendment 
rights, Buckley identified three categories of governmental interest 
that survive exacting scrutiny.82 
The first category is an informational interest to provide the 
electorate with relevant information about a candidate.83  This 
interest is justified in that voters may be better equipped to 
evaluate a candidate’s ideology and determine what interests that 
candidate may be beholden to once in office.84  The second 
category of interest is the deterrence of “actual corruption and 
avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption by exposing large 
contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”85  The last 
category of interest arises when recordkeeping and reporting the 
information provided by disclosure provisions are necessary to 
enforce contribution limitations.86 
Buckley’s as-applied challenge contended the disclosure 
provisions were overbroad regarding contributions “to minor 
parties and independent candidates because the governmental 
interest in this information is minimal and the danger of significant 
infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly increased.”87  
The Court determined the minor party or independent candidate 
needed to actually demonstrate threats, harassment, or reprisals as 
the NAACP showed in Patterson.88  “[Patterson] is inapposite 
where . . . any serious infringement on First Amendment rights 
brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors is highly 
speculative” despite the government’s diminished interest.89  
However, the door was left open for a successful challenge if a 
challenger could provide “record evidence of the sort proffered in 
[Patterson].”90 
	  
81.  See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–61. 
82.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
83.  Id. at 66–67. 
84.  Id.  See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (holding that attaining an 
informed electorate as the only interest needed to justify a disclosure provision). 
85.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
86.  Id. at 67–68. 
87.  Id. at 68–69. 
88.  Id. at 69. 
89.  Id. at 70. 
90.  Id. at 71. 
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The challenger argued “a minor party, particularly a new 
party, may never be able to prove a substantial threat of 
harassment, however real that threat may be, because it would be 
required to come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to 
contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear.”91  The 
Court acknowledged a heavy burden was imposed to prove injury, 
especially for a minor party, and so only a “reasonable probability” 
needed to be present to show compelled disclosure would subject 
contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals.92 
The McIntyre Court, which found an individual who expresses 
her point of view on a contentious political issue may be protected 
from disclosure to ensure that her viewpoint is not silenced from 
public debate, distinguished Buckley in two ways.  First, Margaret 
McIntyre’s independent actions had no implications concerning a 
candidate, thus eliminating actual or apparent corruption.93  
Second, disclosure of core political speech—such as Ms. McIntyre’s 
independent expenditure by producing election-related leaflets—
was not useful to the electorate and was “particularly intrusive” to 
her.94 
The Court’s first major decision that turned away from 
McIntyre’s protection of core political speech in favor of Buckley’s 
reasonable probability of Patterson-type harm requirement was 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.95  The court in 
McConnell upheld the district court’s application of the Buckley 
standard, which stated, “[a]lthough this testimony demonstrates 
that [organization] members may ‘fear’ the potential consequences 
of their names being disclosed in connection with [the 
organization], there is no evidence before the Court that these 
feared consequences have been, or would be, realized.”96  This 
application requires “specific” evidence of an incoming, or actual, 
realization event of threats, harassment, or reprisals.97  The 
implications are staggering; an individual must comply with 
disclosure requirements and subject herself to possible death 
	  
91.  Id. at 73–74. 
92.  Id. at 74. 
93.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 354. 
94.  Id. at 355. 
95.  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
96. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 246 (D.D.C.) 
judgment entered, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D.D.C. 2003) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
97.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199. 
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threats or loss of gainful employment for merely associating herself 
with an organization in support (or in opposition) of a candidate or 
issue.  Only then may that individual challenge the disclosure law, 
as an as-applied challenger, or as an aggrieved party under a facial 
challenge, at which point action would be futile.98 
The disclosure laws at issue in McConnell were challenged in 
Citizens United.99  The Citizens United Court affirmed 
McConnell’s disclosure provisions, but went further by holding an 
informational interest alone was sufficient to satisfy exacting 
scrutiny.100  The Court explained, “disclosure permits citizens and 
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper 
way.  This transparency enables the electorate to make informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”101  The Court further stated commercial speech may be 
subject to electoral campaign disclosure laws under certain 
circumstances.102 
The challenger’s argument for the Buckley minor-party 
exception was quickly rejected when it could not put forward 
specific evidence that its members would face threats, harassment, 
or reprisals in the event of disclosure.103  However, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the exception for minor parties remained 
available on a case-by-case basis.  Therefore, the state’s 
informational interest is currently the most important justification 
to satisfy exacting scrutiny.104 
C.    Applying the Buckley Exception to a Minor Political Party 
In Brown v. Socialist Workers,105 the Socialist Workers Party 
	  
98. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 203 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he as-
applied exemption becomes practically worthless if speakers cannot obtain the 
exemption quickly and well in advance of speaking.”). 
99. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366. 
100. Id. at 369 (holding for the first time an informational interest alone was 
sufficient to overcome exacting scrutiny).  See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). 
101.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. 
102.   Id. at 369.  A documentary regarding then-Senator Hilary Clinton was at 
issue.  Id. at 319–320.  “Potentially . . . even ads from a competitor business that 
criticize a business owned by a candidate could be regulable ads if the ads are run 
directly before an election and mention the candidate.”  Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the 
Tide Turned In Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens 
United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1081 (2011). 
103.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370. 
104.  Johnstone, supra note 38, at 422. 
105.  Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 
(1982). 
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(“SWP”), a small Ohio-based political party with approximately 
sixty members, in a 1974 class action, challenged an Ohio statute 
that required disclosure of the names and addresses of every 
monetary contributor and recipient of campaign disbursements.106  
The law required disclosure regardless of the size of the 
contribution or disbursement.107  Any failure to comply was 
punishable by a fine of $1,000 per day.108 
The SWP sought to effectuate its ideals entirely through the 
political process.109  When it ran a candidate in the 1980 United 
States Senate race, the SWP received less than two percent of the 
vote.110  It was such a small-scale party that it averaged only $15,000 
annually in contributions between 1974 and 1980.111 
The SWP successfully challenged the law’s constitutionality 
under the Buckley minor-party exception, as-applied to itself.112  
The state of Ohio conceded that the exception applied to 
contributors, but argued it did not apply to recipients of campaign 
disbursements.113  The Supreme Court rejected this “narrow” view 
of the Buckley minor-party exception.114  It reasoned that the 
government’s interest was weaker in comparison with the threat 
facing minor parties’ First Amendment rights.115  The individuals 
who make contributions and receive disbursements are those 
whose actions “lie at the very core of the First Amendment.”116  
Disclosure of these persons’ identities would subject them to 
“threats, harassment, and reprisals.”117  Moreover, “[t]he fact that 
some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may not 
be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the 
serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those 
who are so exposed.”118 
The framework established by these cases contains 
ambiguities, which leaves open the possibility of expansion of the 
	  
106.  Id. at 88–89. 
107.  Id. at 91 n.6. 
108.  Id. at 90. 
109.  Id. at 88. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 91. 
113.  Id. at 94. 
114.  Id. at 95. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. at 97. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. at 97 n.14. 
2016] COMPELLED SPEECH 105 
Buckley minor-party exception.  The Court in Patterson and 
Brown expanded the robustness of the First Amendment, and in 
McIntyre “codified the anonymous speech doctrine.”119  This 
framework allows for the recognition of a right of anonymous 
association for minor, issue-oriented advocates. 
II. CONNECTING SEEMINGLY DEVIATING JURISPRUDENCE 
Part A of this section will argue which minority advocates 
ought to be exempt from disclosure.  Part B will argue the degree 
of severity of threats, harassment, and reprisals necessary to 
overcome a state’s informational interest does not need to arise to 
that seen in Patterson.  Part C will argue that the strength of 
associational speech is greater than that of speech expressed by 
monetary transfer.  Finally, Part D will conclude that the right to 
associate expressed in Patterson falls within the framework created 
by Citizens United. 
A.  Establishing Which Minority-Advocates Ought to be Exempt 
from Disclosure 
The Citizens United Court reaffirmed the Buckley minor-
party exception applicability in the context of electoral 
disclosure.120  However, the Court has yet to define who or what 
constitutes a minor-party for the purposes of this exception.  As a 
result, there are those, such as Charles and David Koch, who 
advocate widely-popular views, yet claim they are themselves 
dissenters who qualify for the Buckley minor-party exception 
because those views are in discord with the political party in 
office.121  That argument is deceptive at best.  A vast divergence 
exists between Margaret McIntyre,122 the NAACP’s 1950s Alabama 
chapter123 and the Koch brothers who have an estimated combined 
net worth of $80 billon.124  Indeed, the Kochs’ political network has 
	  
119. Jason M. Shepard  & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First 
Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and 
Election Speech, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 92, 103. 
120.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010). 
121.  See Edsall, supra note 11 (quoting Rob Tappan, a spokesman for Koch 
Industries). 
122.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
123. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
124.  Louis Jacobson, Harry Reid Says Koch Brothers are Richest Family in the 
World, POLITIFACT.COM, (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2014/apr/02/harry-reid/harry-reid-says-koch-brothers-are-richest-
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been described as, in effect, a third major political party.125  
Accordingly, while the Kochs are only two individuals, their 
monetary worth coupled with their stated intent, gives them 
exceedingly greater influence in the political arena than the 
majority of other individuals.  Though, conversely, as seen in 
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,126 the proponent of popular, 
though not necessarily majoritarian, viewpoints should also not be 
protected by the minor-party exception.127  The result is that too 
much power or influence, whether by monetary means or number 
of supporters, disqualifies advocates from minority status. 
Moreover, the ProtectMarriage.com lower court, relying on 
Socialist Workers, set a high bar for future minor-parties when 
applying the Buckley minor-party exception.  It determined the 
same-sex marriage opponents were not a minor-party because they 
had neither a small constituency nor did they promote a historically 
unpopular idea.128  As a result, that court viewed minor status as a 
“necessary element of a successful as-applied claim” but not 
sufficient without “seeking to further ideas historically and 
pervasively rejected and vilified by both this country’s government 
and its citizens.”129  Thus, while the court was correct in 
determining the same-sex marriage opponents were not a minor-
party, it created a difficult burden for minority groups with new 
and ostracized viewpoints from gaining protection under the 
Buckley exception. 
Therefore, the Court should adopt a subjective spectrum, 
based upon certain factors, that affords true minority-advocacy 
groups protection under the Buckley exception to disclosure, 
whether their views are historically or newly despised.  Relevant 
	  
family-w/ [http://perma.cc/2T9W-RK2C].  See also The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (ranking the wealthiest 
people on the planet with Charles and David Koch tied individually at six). 
125.  Confessore, supra note 8. 
126.  ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  
See infra Part II.B. 
127. Interestingly, the lack of clarity in Supreme Court compelled disclosure 
jurisprudence may be due, in part, to the Justices’ consciousness of the particular issue 
in each case.  See McGeveran, supra note 12 at 870 n.75. 
It is possible that the Justices’ views were colored by the nature of the 
particular issue in [Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010)], a referendum to 
repeal gay rights legislation.  It may be coincidence, but Justices generally 
seen as more likely to support gay rights wrote the opinions most skeptical 
about the prospect of as-applied exemptions in Doe and vice versa. 
Id. 
128.  ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
129.  Id. at 1215. 
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factors should include: tenuousness of the group’s finances, degree 
of unpopularity, and members’ interests in the group’s success.  On 
the spectrum, as the members’ interests increase, so too should the 
Court’s willingness to allow Buckley’s exception. 
B.  Defining the Level of Harassment Necessary to Overcome the 
State’s Informational Interest 
The Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosure 
from minor political parties if the party can show “a reasonable 
probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ 
names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from 
either Government officials or private parties.”130 
Yet, the Court did not put forth a test to determine what type, 
degree, or level of threat, harassment, or reprisal is necessary to 
satisfy the disclosure exception.  In creating the Buckley minor-
party exception, the Court relied upon the strong evidence of 
threats and harassment put forward in Patterson.131  That reliance, 
though, was on the amount and specificity of the evidence put 
forth, rather than the type, degree, or level of threats, harassment, 
or reprisals faced by members.132  Subsequent cases used Patterson 
as the standard to judge threats, harassment, and reprisals.133  This 
Note proposes that a subjective evaluation is the proper standard a 
court should use to assess as-applied challenges.  Further, the 
standard should be proactive—to prevent actual instances of 
threats, harassment, and reprisals—rather than reactionary by 
requiring present or past instances of such. 
This proposal can be illustrated using the facts of 
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, where a class of major donors and 
other advocacy groups challenged a ballot initiative to California’s 
Political Reform Act of 1974.134  The proponents of the initiative 
sought to define “marriage” as only “between a man and a woman” 
and the plaintiffs alleged that contributors to the cause faced 
	  
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).  This exception was 
adopted in Citizens United but will be referred to as the Buckley minor-party 
exception.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010). 
131.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71. 
132.  Id. 
133. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 
(1982); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); ProtectMarriage.com v. 
Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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threats, harassment, and reprisals.135  There was evidence of 
numerous instances of threats, harassment, and reprisals against 
supporters of the ballot.136  A threat made to the Mayor of Fresno, 
California stated: 
If I had a gun I would have gunned you down along with each 
and every other supporter . . . .  Anybody who has a YES ON 
PROP 8 sign or banner in fron [sic] of their house or bumper 
sticker on the car in Fresno is in danger of being shot or 
firebombed.  Fresno is not safe for anyone who supports Prop 8 
. . . .  If you thought 9/11 was bad, you haven’t seen anything 
yet.137 
Economic reprisals included, “[the] manager of El Coyote 
restaurant took a voluntary leave of absence after reports of her 
$100 donation to support Proposition 8 led to boycotts and 
protestors at the establishment owned by her mother.”138  In 
another instance, California disclosure laws required an individual 
contributor to provide the name of his business when making a 
monetary contribution, such as the plaintiff donors made, to 
effectuate their advocacy.  As a result, cars in the parking lot of his 
business were “papered” with flyers detailing his monetary 
support.139  Additionally, a sponsored link appeared on Google 
when searching for that same individual, which referenced his 
monetary support of the plaintiff advocacy groups.140 
The court in ProtectMarriage.com observed the threats, 
harassment, and reprisals in evidence were insufficient to satisfy 
the Buckley minor-party exception test.141  The court’s holding, 
however, was based on the plaintiffs not being covered by the 
“minority party” requirement of the Buckley exception, as they 
were not a group with a “small constituenc[y] and [did not] 
promot[e] historically unpopular and almost universally-rejected 
ideas.”142  The court further stated the facts at issue were 
distinguishable from prior cases because the threats, harassment, 
and reprisals took place “during the heat of an election battle 
	  
135.  Id. at 1199–1200. 
136.  See id. 
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138.  Id. at 1201. 
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141.  Id. at 1216. 
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surrounding a hotly contested ballot initiative.”143 
This viewpoint is in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s 
1995 decision in McIntyre.  McIntyre emphasized that contentious, 
issue based political speech is “the essence of First Amendment 
expression.”144  While McIntyre involved a local, school tax issue, 
which surely can be acrimonious, it does not invoke the same level 
of passion and emotion as does same-sex marriage, which has 
become one of the most hotly debated and pivotal civil rights issues 
of the past decade.145  Nonetheless, “[n]o form of speech is entitled 
to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre’s.”146  
Therefore, while the plaintiffs in ProtectMarriage.com were unable 
to show threats, harassment, and reprisals of the same severity as 
the plaintiffs in Patterson and Socialist Workers, the threats and 
harassment shown by the ProtectMarriage.com plaintiffs should be 
sufficient for future similar challengers to invoke the Buckley 
minor-party exception. 
Similarly, the same ballot initiative in ProtectMarriage.com, 
was the focal point in Hollingsworth v. Perry.147  Defendants 
applied for a stay of an order allowing the trial of an action 
challenging the affirmed ballot to be broadcast by video and audio 
means, to other federal courthouses.148  To grant the stay, the 
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146.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.  See also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (finding speech regarding an income tax referendum “is at the 
heart of the First Amendment’s protection”). 
147.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010). 
148.  Id. at 184–85. 
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applicants were required to show that irreparable harm would 
result absent a denial of the stay.149  The Court granted the stay as 
the defendants successfully showed prior instances of harassment 
surrounding the ballot initiative.150  Consequently, witness 
testimony would be chilled as they had reason to believe they 
would face harassment by being exposed during a nation-wide 
broadcast.151  Accordingly, if threats, harassment, and reprisals 
against witnesses are egregious enough to procure a restricted trial, 
the same threats, harassment, and reprisals should be sufficient to 
satisfy Buckley’s minor party exception to disclosure.  Crucially, 
this argument only applies to the rank-and-file-esque member who 
does nothing more than donate to or associate with an advocacy 
group.  It would not apply in the example from 
ProtectMarriage.com above, regarding the Fresno Mayor, because 
he is a public figure who attended a public rally.  It also does not 
apply to members who openly broadcast their support by bumper 
stickers, signs in front lawns, or similar modes.152 
Additionally, although the Court in Citizens United held that 
the informational justification alone was sufficient to warrant 
disclosure, this argument is only persuasive if the disclosure 
actually results in a more informed electorate.153  The Buckley 
minor-party exception should only be overcome in narrow 
circumstances.  The fact that more information is available, i.e. 
donor names of minority groups, does not automatically create a 
more well informed voter.  For example, McIntyre involved an 
individual who wrote and printed leaflets on her own accord.154  No 
evidence suggested Ms. McIntyre was any more prominent a citizen 
than any other voter in her district.155  Unless she were a public 
figure, or otherwise invested in the result for reasons her fellow 
voters would find repugnant, the electorate was no better off 
	  
149.  Id. at 190. 
150.  Id. at 195. 
151.  Id. at 195–96. 
152. See also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the 
Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405 (2012) (discussing economic 
reprisals in the form of consumer boycotts resulting from a retailer’s support of a 
Minnesota gubernatorial candidate opposed to same-sex marriage). 
153.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369–70 (2010).  But 
cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“The public right to know ought not be absolute when its 
exercise reveals private political convictions . . . .  On the contrary, secrecy and privacy 
as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental in a free society.”). 
154.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995). 
155.  See id. 
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reading her name at the bottom of the leaflets than if they were not 
signed.  The content of the message would have remained exactly 
the same—just as true or false.  As the Court noted, “a handbill 
written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the 
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the 
reader’s ability to evaluate the document’s message.  Thus, Ohio’s 
informational interest is plainly insufficient to support the 
constitutionality of its disclosure requirement.”156 
Furthermore, not only may additional information be useless 
in actually informing voters, it may be acutely detrimental in 
conveying an accurate message.  If the speaker’s identity is 
disclosed, the issue the message supports may suffer from prejudice 
merely upon the basis of who speaks in its favor.157  Conversely, the 
message may be disregarded without having been read or heard 
solely due to the identity of the speaker.158  In neither of these 
situations are the merits of the speech considered. 
Therefore, the Buckley exception to disclosure for minor-party 
members who face threats, harassment, or reprisals due to 
disclosure of their identities, should be satisfied by showing a 
reasonable probability of the severity of harm as seen in 
ProtectMarriage.com and Hollingsworth rather than that seen in 
Patterson.  Moreover, unless disclosure results in a more informed 
electorate, the state’s interest is not sufficient to overcome the 
Buckley minor-party exception. 
C. Defining the Strength of Associational Speech in Relation to 
Other Methods of Speech 
The freedom of association is unquestionably a form of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.159  However, it is unclear how 
strong this form of speech is, and therefore the level of protection it 
	  
156.  Id. at 348–49. 
157.  Id. at 342–43. 
Anonymity . . . provides a way for a writer who may be personally 
unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply 
because they do not like its proponent.  Thus, even in the field of political 
rhetoric, where “the identity of the speaker is an important component of 
many attempts to persuade,” the most effective advocates have sometimes 
opted for anonymity. 
Id. (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)). 
158.  See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342–43. 
159.  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that the “freedom to engage in association” is 
“inseparable” from the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech). 
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deserves in comparison to other forms of speech is likewise unclear.  
This problem arises, in part, because one may associate with a 
group through membership or by monetary contribution.  This 
Note posits association by membership deserves greater protection 
than association through monetary means.  Further, that 
association by membership is as strong as, and therefore deserves 
the same degree of protection, as the express speech at issue in 
McIntyre. 
There are at least two ways to examine the effects of First 
Amendment infringements: first, to focus on the actual individual 
speaker; second, to focus on public deliberation as a whole.160  
When individuals are deterred from associating with like-minded 
fellows, the views of the group as a whole are thereby suppressed.161  
Suppression of associational speech may serve as an absolute bar to 
minority or dissident views from entering the public discourse, both 
of which should be encouraged and embraced in a democracy.162 
Associational speech for minority or dissident groups may be 
suppressed in numerous ways.163  The court in Brown applied and 
enforced Buckley’s minor-party exception largely because the 
“potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially 
greater”164 regarding minor parties because 
These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base 
and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions.  In 
some instances fears of reprisals may deter contributions to the 
point where the movement cannot survive.  The public interest 
also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent 
reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and 
without the political arena.165 
	  
160.  Ho, supra note 152, at 412–13 (defining the former as the “anti-chilling” 
interpretation while the latter as the “anti-suppression” interpretation). 
161.  See Ho, supra note 152, at 412–13. 
162. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (“There is, of course, no 
reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have 
people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at 
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating there exists a “profound national 
commitment . . . that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open . . . .”). 
163. By way of example, using threats, harassment, or reprisals to dissuade 
individuals from associating with, participating in, or donating to these minority or 
dissident groups. 
164. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 92 
(1982). 
165.  Id. at 93 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam)). 
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Brown is supported by the Court’s statement in Patterson that 
“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
association.”166 
Conversely, the Court rejected a freedom of association 
defense when the petitioner in Barenblatt v. United States refused 
to answer certain questions asked by the Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities.167  The questions 
included, “Are you now a member of the Communist Party?” and 
“Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?”168  The 
Court observed, “Where First Amendment rights are asserted to 
bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always 
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and 
public interests at stake . . . .”169  Congress was deemed to have 
“wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity . . . and 
to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof.”170  The Court 
made no secret that its decision rested on prejudice based upon 
associational ties when it stated, 
To suggest that because the Communist Party may also sponsor 
peaceable political reforms the constitutional issues before us 
should now be judged as if that Party were just an ordinary 
political party from the standpoint of national security, is to ask 
this Court to blind itself to world affairs which have determined 
the whole course of our national policy since the close of World 
War II . . . .171 
The Court concluded “the balance between the individual and the 
governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the 
latter, and that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment 
have not been offended.”172 
Yet the dissent was critical of the Court’s disregard of the 
Constitution based upon its stereotype that Communists did not 
constitute a political party, but rather a criminal gang.173  
	  
166.  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
167. Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109, 113 (1959).  While Barenblatt is 
undoubtedly an outlier, it illustrates how contemporary politics may cause disregard of 
First Amendment rights. 
168.  Id. at 114. 
169.  Id. at 126. 
170.  Id. at 127. 
171.  Id. at 128–29. 
172.  Id. at 134 (Black, J., dissenting). 
173.  Id. at 146. 
114 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:89 
Furthermore, that because some members of the Communist Party 
pursued illegal aims, not all members did so.174  Instead, Justice 
Black saw the potential slippery slope for First Amendment 
violations created by the majority.175  “[O]nce we allow any group 
which has some political aims or ideas to be driven from the ballot 
and from the battle for men’s minds because some of its members 
are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no group is safe.”176 
These instances illustrate the necessity of including 
associational speech within the purview of the First Amendment.  
Great injustice will arise when that right is infringed.177  Thus, to 
avoid grievous inequity, associational speech should be afforded 
the same level of protection as express speech. 
The Court in Buckley stated that associational advocacy was 
less effective without the ability to pool funds obtained by 
contributions.178  It further stated the “privacy of belief” may be 
invaded when the disclosed information concerns memberships as 
well as monetary contributions because “‘[f]inancial transactions 
can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and 
beliefs.’”179  Conversely, the Court in McIntyre emphasized “money 
may ‘talk,’ [but] its speech is less specific, less personal, and less 
provocative than a handbill.”180 
These points of analysis are in accord with each other when 
viewing the independent nature of the respective form of 
expression.  Group membership, like verbal speech or writing, is an 
independent act that allows one to directly associate.  On the other 
hand, contributing money lacks the same degree of independence.  
It is a dissociative (albeit supportive) act.  When an individual is a 
	  
174.  Id. at 147. 
175.  Id. 
176. Id. at 150.  Justice Black went further and illustrated prior instances of 
baseless prejudice throughout American history, including: Socialists in the 1920s, 
Masons in the 1830s, and Jacobins in the time of the alien sedition laws.  Id. at 150–51.  
“[I]n times of high emotional excitement minority parties and groups which advocate 
extremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will always be typed as 
criminal gangs and attempts will always be made to drive them out.”  Id. at 151. 
177.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
178.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1976) (per curiam) (“The right to join 
together ‘for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,’ is diluted if it does not include the 
right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is 
to be truly or optimally ‘effective.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored 
People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)) (internal citations omitted)). 
179. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (quoting California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)) (alteration in original). 
180.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). 
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group member, she then has a personal, unique interest in the 
views expressed by the group and the group itself—whereas a 
second individual who supports a group by monetary means has 
less skin in the game as that support may be quantified and 
matched by any other individual by an equal donation.181 
Inverse to the degree of independence are the states’ interests 
in having an informed electorate, avoiding the appearance of 
corruption, and actual corruption.182  As the independence of 
speech increases, the state’s interest in disclosure decreases, and 
vice versa.  For example when a person contributes money to a 
candidate, the state has a strong interest in ensuring that candidate 
is not held indebted to her supporter.  On the other hand, when 
another person expresses her opinion on an issue that candidates 
have taken opposing sides on, the state’s interest in the speaker’s 
identity dwindles.  It is imperative that an individual who expresses 
her opinion be able to do so.  That necessity ensures an individual’s 
self-autonomy as well as a robust marketplace of ideas.183  
Therefore, associational speech based on membership should be 
afforded the same safeguards as other forms of speech. 
D.   Patterson Was Impliedly Embraced by Citizens United 
Citizens United generally represents the Court’s recent trend 
of favoring disclosure requirements.184  While compelled disclosure 
is a restriction on speech, it is often justified.185  Just as the right to 
speak is not absolute, nor are the justifications that restrict 
	  
181.  For example, for several years the Boy Scouts of America has been mired in 
controversy regarding its policy to not allow openly gay adults to serve in its 
organization.  Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts’ President Calls for End to Ban on Gay 
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/us/boy-
scouts-president-calls-for-end-to-ban-on-gay-leaders.html.  If an individual were to 
donate money in support of this policy (or in support of its revocation), he would have 
less of a personal, unique interest in his support for the Boy Scouts than if he joined the 
organization as a volunteer. 
182.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
183.  See Ho, supra note 152, at 413–18 (discussing anti-chilling of self-autonomy 
and anti-suppression of the marketplace of ideas).  See also McGeveran, supra note 12 
at 877–78 (“Many individuals whose opinions differ from those around them will put 
their heads down and disengage from political activity if that is the only way to avoid 
disclosure.”).  Interestingly, Professor McGeveran posits the social ostracism that may 
result for Democrats in vastly Republican locales and Republicans in deep blue 
territory may be sufficient to invoke exemption from disclosure.  McGeveran, supra 
note 12, at 878. 
184.  See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  See also Ho, supra note 152, at 418 (“[C]ourts 
have typically favored disclosure in the campaign finance context.”). 
185.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
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speech.186  One avenue in which disclosure may be circumnavigated 
involves minor group associations.187 
Although Citizens United was decided with no mention of 
Patterson, it impliedly fits within the Citizens United framework.  
The Court in Citizens United reaffirmed the Buckley principle 
regarding disclosure by holding an informational interest was solely 
sufficient to affirm the disclosure provisions at issue.188  Moreover, 
it applied the Buckley minor-party exception but found insufficient 
evidence to satisfy the standard for exception.189  Nevertheless, 
Citizens United did not reference Patterson once, despite its 
relevance, while the Court in Buckley relied heavily upon 
Patterson when it created these standards.190  “The strict test 
established by Patterson is necessary because compelled disclosure 
has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”191 
In fact, the minor party exception was created as an exception 
to the three categories of government interests that were found 
sufficient to overcome Patterson’s freedom of association 
justification.192  Buckley stated that the minor party exception 
would not apply when threats, harassment, or reprisals were 
“highly speculative” in infringing First Amendment rights.193  
Therefore, as Citizens United applied the exception test, it 
impliedly embraced Patterson.  As a result, freedom of association 
arguments as used in Patterson and its progeny are alive and well 
to be utilized in challenges against compelled disclosure statutes. 
III. APPLYING CURRENT LAW TO CONNECTICUT AND 
MASSACHUSETTS 
A.  Connecticut’s Response to Citizens United: P.A. 13-180 
In 2013, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy signed Public 
Act No. 13-180, An Act Concerning Disclosure of Independent 
Expenditures and Changes to Other Campaign Finance Laws and 
Election Laws (“Act”), into law, which significantly amended 
	  
186.  Id. at 69. 
187.    See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). 
188.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010). 
189.  Id. at 370. 
190.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
191.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 
192.  Id. at 66, 69–70. 
193.  Id. at 70. 
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Connecticut’s campaign finance disclosure provisions.194  He stated 
Citizens United was “a tragic decision,” but is the reason he signed 
the bill.195  The purpose of the Act was to make sure that people 
who are trying to hide their speech . . . have to disclose”196 and to 
allow “the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper 
weight to different speakers and messages . . . [and] help to shine 
light on that money so that we know who is behind it and where it 
is corning from.”197 
The National Institute on Money in State Politics conducted a 
survey of all fifty states to research how stringent each state’s laws 
were regarding disclosure requirements for independent spending, 
giving Connecticut an “A.”198  Despite Connecticut’s then-strong 
disclosure requirements, the Connecticut General Assembly still 
felt the need, in response to Citizens United, to enact sweeping 
legislation.199 
Under current Connecticut law that incorporates PA 13-180, a 
person200 may make an independent expenditure201 of an unlimited 
amount, but must file specific disclosure statements electronically 
with the state when the aggregate amount exceeds one thousand 
	  
194.  See 2013 Conn. Acts 718 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9). 
195.  Pazniokas, supra note 13. 
196.  56 S. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 4734 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of Senator 
Anthony Musto) 
197.  56 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 8404 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of 
Representative Ed Jutila). 
198. Scorecard: Essential Disclosure Requirements for Independent Spending, 
2013, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG (May 16, 2013), http://classic.followthemoney.org// 
press/ReportView.phtml?r=495 [http://perma.cc/28VN-EBFZ]. Massachusetts was also 
given an “A.”  Id. 
199.  Id.; See generally 56 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 8404 (Conn. 2013); 56 
S. Proc., Pt. 15, 2013 Sess., p. 4765 (Conn. 2013). 
200. “‘Person’ means an individual, committee, firm, partnership, organization, 
association, syndicate, company trust, corporation, limited liability company or any 
other legal entity of any kind but does not mean the state or any political or 
administrative subdivision of the state.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601(10) (2015). 
201. “‘[I]ndependent expenditure’ means an expenditure . . . that is made without 
the consent, coordination, or consultation of, a candidate or agent of the candidate, 
candidate committee, political committee or party committee.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-
601c(a) (2015); 
“[E]xpenditure” means . . . [a]ny purchase, payment, distribution, loan, 
advance, deposit or gift of money or anything of value, when made to 
promote the success or defeat of any candidate seeking the nomination for 
election, or election, of any person or for the purpose of aiding or 
promoting the success or defeat of any referendum question or the success 
or defeat of any political party. 
Id. § 9-601b(a)(1) (2015). 
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dollars, provided it is within the time frame of a primary or general 
election campaign.202  However, if the person makes or obligates to 
make an independent expenditure the disclosure statement is made 
on a “long-form” and “short-form” report.203  The long-form 
requirements include the “name of the person making or obligating 
to make” the expenditure; the mailing address and business address 
if different than the mailing address of that same person; the name 
of the candidate(s) the expenditure is meant to support or oppose; 
and the name, phone number, and email address of the individual 
filing the report.204  The short-form requirements include the 
“name of the person making or obligating to make” the 
expenditure; the amount of the expenditure; a description of the 
expenditure; and the name, phone number, and email address of 
the individual filing the report.205  The long-form is used for a 
person’s initial independent expenditure, while the short-form is 
used for any subsequent independent expenditure.206 
Additionally, the Act created a new category of monetary 
transfer called a “covered transfer.”207  A covered transfer is “any 
donation, transfer or payment of funds by a person to another 
person if the person receiving the donation, transfer or payment 
makes independent expenditures or transfers funds to another 
	  
202.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(a) (2015). 
“General election campaign” means (A) in the case of a candidate 
nominated at a primary, the period beginning on the day following the 
primary and ending on the date the treasurer files the final statement for 
such campaign . . . or (B) in the case of a candidate nominated without a 
primary, the period beginning on the day following the day on which the 
candidate is nominated and ending on the date the treasurer files the final 
statement for such campaign . . . . 
Id. § 9-700(7) (2015). 
“Primary campaign” means the period beginning on the day following the 
close of (A) a convention held . . . for the purpose of endorsing a candidate 
for nomination to the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney 
General, State Comptroller, State Treasurer or Secretary of the State or 
the district office of state senator or state representative, or (B) a caucus, 
convention or town committee meeting held . . . for the purpose of 
endorsing a candidate for the municipal office of state senator or state 
representative, whichever is applicable, and ending on the day of a primary 
held for the purpose of nominating a candidate for such office. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-700(11) (2015). 
203.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(b) (2015). 
204.  Id. § 9-601d(c) (emphasis added). 
205.  Id. § 9-601d(d) (emphasis added). 
206.  Id. § 9-601d(b) (2015).  The purpose of having two forms is to reduce the 
amount of paperwork required by the filing person. See 56 S. Proc., Pt. 15, 2013 Sess., 
p. 4765 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of Senator Anthony Musto). 
207.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601(29)(A) (2015). 
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person who makes independent expenditures.”208  A person must 
disclose the source of a covered transfer, the amount received when 
that person received the covered transfer during the preceding 
twelve month period before a primary or general election, and “is 
made or obligated to be made on or after the date that is one 
hundred eighty days prior to such primary or election.”209 
B.   Massachusetts’ Response to Citizens United: H. 4366 
House Bill number 4366, An Act relative to campaign finance 
disclosure and transparency (hereinafter “H. 4366”),210 was signed 
into law by Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick on August 1, 
2014.211  Unlike Connecticut’s Act, Massachusetts’ was heralded as 
“an excellent first challenge to Citizens United,”212 while Governor 
Patrick stated it was “exactly right” conceptually.213  Under current 
Massachusetts law, all individuals, groups, and entities that make 
an independent expenditure214 that is greater than two hundred 
	  
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. § 9-601d(f)(1). 
210.  An Act relative to campaign finance disclosure and transparency, ch. 210, 
2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. 683 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 55) 
211. Shira Schoenberg, Gov. Deval Patrick Signs Super PAC Disclosure Law, 
MASS LIVE, (Aug. 4, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/ 
08/gov_deval_patrick_signs_super.html#incart_related_stories [http://perma.cc/4A43-
3X2N]. 
212.  Schoenberg, supra note 13 (quoting Rep. Linda Campbell Democratic vice 
chair of the Joint Committee on Election Laws). 
213.  Schoenberg, supra note 210. 
214.  Massachusetts defines an independent expenditure as: 
[A]n expenditure made or liability incurred by an individual, group, 
association, corporation, labor union, political committee or other entity as 
payment for goods or services to expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate; provided, however, that the expenditure is 
made or incurred without cooperation or consultation with any candidate 
or a nonelected political committee organized on behalf of the candidate or 
an agent of the candidate and is not made or incurred in concert with or at 
the request or suggestion of the candidate, a nonelected political 
committee organized on behalf of the candidate or agent of the candidate. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 1 (Supp. 2015). 
“Expenditure,” [is] any expenditure of money, or anything of value, by an 
individual, candidate, or political committee, or a person acting on behalf 
of said individual, candidate, or political committee, for the purpose of 
influencing the nomination or election of said individual or candidate, or of 
presidential and vice presidential electors, or for the purpose of promoting 
or opposing a charter change, referendum question, constitutional 
amendment, or other question submitted to the voters, and shall include: 
(1) any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of 
money, or anything of value; and (2) any transfer of money or anything of 
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fifty dollars in the aggregate, during any calendar year, and the 
express purpose of such expenditure is for or against a candidate, 
must disclose: the name and address of the individual, group, or 
entity making the expenditure; the identification of the candidate 
the expenditure supports or opposes; “the name and address of any 
person to whom the expenditure was made”; the value of the 
expenditure; and its purpose and date.215 
However, the bill also has its critics.216  When addressing a 
portion of the new law that requires disclosure of donors to non-
profit groups, that were exempt under the previous law, Paul 
Craney of the Massachusetts Fiscal Alliance stated, “[i]t’s just there 
to intimidate donors so that they don’t give to organizations, or if 
they do give to organizations, those organizations are reluctant to 
participate in the democratic process in educating the public on 
how lawmakers vote.”217 
C.  P.A. 13-180 and Bill H. 4366 Inadvertently Invite As-Applied 
First Amendment Challenges 
Connecticut’s P.A. 13-180 and Massachusetts’ H. 4366 each are 
susceptible to as-applied challenges by minority advocates due to 
infringement of their freedom to associate.  The Citizens United 
framework makes these challenges possible due to its use of the 
Buckley minor-party exception.  Further, these challenges do not 
need to show a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or 
reprisals amounting to that seen in Patterson, but instead to that 
seen in ProtectMarriage.com and Hollingsworth. 
Connecticut’s new designation of a covered transfer has far-
reaching implications.  Under Connecticut law prior to P.A. 13-180, 
disclaimers218 were only required to appear with independent 
expenditures when they promoted or discouraged an electoral 
candidate’s election or defeat, promoted or discouraged election or 
defeat of a political party, or solicited funds on behalf of a political 
	  
value between political committees. 
Id. 
215.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 18A (Supp. 2015). 
216.  Shoenberg, supra note 12. 
217.  Shoenberg, supra note 12. 
218. Disclaimer is used in the statute to reference disclosed information that 
appears with the independent expenditure, as opposed to a more general disclosure, 
which would appear in documents filed with the Secretary of the State for public 
record.  See Conn. Acts 718 (2013) (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9). 
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action committee (PAC) or political party.219  Now, they must 
appear on every independent expenditure that references a 
political candidate.220  If the independent expenditure was made 
within ninety days of a primary or general election the disclaimer 
required the names of the five individuals who made the largest 
covered transfer in the aggregate within the twelve months 
preceding the primary or general election.221 
The disclosure requirements regarding independent 
expenditures and covered transfers are problematic because they 
are based upon the proximity between when the expenditure is 
made and the dates of a primary or general election.222  In effect, a 
person who has received a covered transfer(s) of the specified 
aggregate amount must count backwards from the date of the 
primary or general election in order to determine the level of 
disclosure applicable to that person when the independent 
expenditure is made.223  As a result, there is uncertainty as to when 
disclosure must be made.224  Issues such as these adversely affect 
individuals’ and small organizations’ abilities to comply with the 
applicable statute, thus being subject to statutory penalty which 
may include fines or incarceration, merely as a result of engaging in 
political advocacy. 
Similarly, there is another disparity that makes statutory 
compliance less burdensome for larger and well-funded 
organizations. Section 9-601b(b)(13) defines any “lawful 
communication” by a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) group as not amounting 
to an expenditure.225  As a result, those communications do not 
require disclosure of any information about the 501(c)(3) group, its 
members, or contributors.  Whereas a minor group or individual, 
	  
219.  See Conn. Acts 718 (2013) (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9). 
220.  See id. 
221.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-621 (2015). 
222.  See id. § 9-601d(b), (f)(1) (2015). 
223. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(b), (f)(1) (2015).  See Administration of 
Independent Expenditure Disclosure Requirements Under Public Act 13-180, 
Declaratory Ruling 2013-01 (Conn. State Elections Enforcement Commission Nov. 20, 
2013), http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/declaratory_ruling_2013-
01_-_independent_expenditures_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6NF-WSLS]. 
224.  See Administration of Independent Expenditure Disclosure Requirements 
Under Public Act 13-180, Declaratory Ruling 2013-01 (Conn. State Elections 
Enforcement Commission Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_ 
regulations/declaratory_ruling_2013-01_-_independent_expenditures_final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E6NF-WSLS]. 
225.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601b(b)(13) (2015). 
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such as Margaret McIntyre, is unlikely to have the funds or 
knowledge to comply with the statutory requirements, a larger 
group will.  Thus the statute in effect incentivizes anonymity for 
large groups and deters minor group participation. 
Additionally, the new law creates a further disclosure burden 
in adding the phrase “or obligates to make” to “makes” regarding 
when a long and short form must be filed with the state.  The 
phrase “or obligates to make” has been declared226 to mean the 
disclosure report may be required at a point in time before a 
person actually spends her funds on an independent expenditure.227  
The effect is that persons and groups that advocate dissident 
viewpoints stand to face threats, harassment, and reprisals before 
they even make an independent expenditure.  Consequently, these 
individuals and groups may be deterred from even fulfilling their 
obligation to make an independent expenditure. 
Massachusetts’ H. 4366 is less stringent than Connecticut’s 
P.A. 13-180.  While H. 4366 requires filing a report with the state 
by an individual or entity that makes an independent expenditure 
that exceeds two hundred fifty dollars in the aggregate, it has no 
statutory designation synonymous to Connecticut’s covered 
transfer.228  Alternatively, § 18A categorizes a group an 
“independent expenditure PAC” when it receives contributions 
that are then used to make independent expenditures.229 
When a group is deemed an independent expenditure PAC, it 
must disclose the name and address of the person who made the 
contribution, and is then also subject to the disclose provisions 
applicable to other political action committees.230  The further 
disclosure then required includes: the name and address of every 
person who contributed fifty dollars or more during the reporting 
period; the name and address of every person who contributed, in 
the aggregate, fifty dollars or more during the reporting period; and 
the name and address of every person who contributed, in the 
	  
226.  There is no statutory definition for the term “obligate.” 
227. See Administration Construction of the Phrase “Make or Obligate to 
Make” as Applied to Disclosure of Independent Expenditures, Declaratory Ruling 
2014-01 (Conn. State Elections Enforcement Commission Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/final_signed_declaratory_ruling_2
014-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7E4-K6R5]. 
228. See An Act relative to campaign finance disclosure and transparency, ch. 
210, 2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. 683 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 55). 
229.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 18A(d) (Supp. 2015). 
230.  Id. § 18A(a)–(b), (d). 
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aggregate, fifty dollars or more during the calendar year.231  The 
result is that an individual’s identity must be disclosed when she 
contributes fifty total dollars within a calendar year and those funds 
are subsequently used by the donee to make an independent 
expenditure.  To some, merely disclosing a residential or business 
address seems a minor inconvenience.  To those expressing 
controversial viewpoints, though, this disclosure risks threats, 
harassment, and reprisals.232 
The new acts stand to discourage individuals from contributing 
to advocacy organizations merely because their identity may be 
disclosed.  The impact of the new law in effect requires the 
identifying information of individuals who reached an aggregate 
amount within a full year prior to a primary or general election. 
CONCLUSION 
Both Connecticut and Massachusetts have recently enacted 
sweeping election law reform with the intention, in part, of keeping 
“dark money” out of electoral politics.  While an important 
objective, both have done so in a fashion that undermines 
democracy by inadvertently suppressing associational speech of 
minorities and dissidents. 
The Supreme Court recognized in Patterson the freedom to 
associate.  The Court demanded that the freedom to associate 
allow those in the minority to express their dissident views without 
fear of threats, harassment, or reprisals.  Accordingly, associational 
speech is a means of expression as well as a defense against 
suppression, and therefore must be granted the same constitutional 
protection as express speech. 
The Court in Buckley created an exception to compelled 
disclosure for minor parties who face a reasonable probability of 
	  
231.  Id. § 18. 
232. With today’s technology, one may continually harass another from the 
convenience of one’s own home by ordering “glitter bombs” sent to another. See, e.g., 
RUINDAYS, http://www.ruindays.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).  That service proudly 
states, 
We at RuinDays.com believe that anyone that has ever wronged you 
should pay.  We discreetly and anonymously package the most annoying 
things possible to receive through mail, and ship them to your worst 
enemies, in an effort to ruin their day.  Just give us their name and address. 
We’ll take care of the rest. 
Id.  Undoubtedly, a crude prank service such as RuinDays—which will mail packages 
that include exploding glitter and fake smelling feces—ordinarily only arises to an 
inconvenience.  However, it illustrates how easily one may harass another when 
knowing only that person’s name and address.	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threat, harassment, or reprisal if their identities were disclosed.  
However, the Court has not been clear what degree of threat, 
harassment, or reprisal is necessary to invoke this exception and 
consequently, has passively denied claims by minorities because 
they could not provide evidence that their harassment equaled that 
seen in Patterson. 
The Supreme Court must create a clear standard to satisfy the 
Buckley exception for threats, harassment, or reprisals that 
conforms to contemporary instances of such.  Until the Court does 
so, Connecticut and Massachusetts face the likelihood of as-applied 
challenges based upon unconstitutional associational infringement. 
